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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

**THE MARINE CORPS MARTIAL ARTS PROGRAM:
SUSTAINING THE TRANSFORMATION**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program: Sustaining the Transformation.

Author: Major Richard D. Hall, USMC

Thesis: Given the changing nature of society and its effect on America's youth who make up the recruiting population, the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) may well be the mechanism that helps sustain that vital Marine Corps ethos formed during transformation at recruit training and Officer Candidate School.

Discussion: Historically, there has been a natural tendency for governments to reduce their focus on warfighting issues during times of peace which often leads to a less effective military. Additionally, there are some who would say America is becoming more desensitized to violence and more casualty averse. Together, these conditions may well be the cause for the U.S. military to be less prepared to fight the next war. Consequently, it remains crucial for the Corps to guard against external pressures that might moderate or diminish combat preparedness. It must therefore continue to instill and maintain a warrior ethos within every Marine. It is this ethos, developed during the transformation at recruit training and Officer Candidate School, or in the crucible of war, that has defined what it means to be a Marine since 1775. The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) aids in sustaining that transformation. It is the first close combat system that ties together the mental, character, and physical disciplines into a program designed to effectively enhance a Marine's total capability. The program's synergy leads to the creation of an ethical warrior who becomes more concerned for the team than himself, and one who not only understands but also can apply the responsible use of force, a characteristic critical on today's and future battlefields.

Conclusion and Recommendations: The Corps must maintain and never lose its Marine Corps ethos or it will suffer a severe loss in warfighting effectiveness. The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is an extremely valuable program in helping sustain the warrior transformation and maintain that vital edge.

Amongst the key recommendations to ensure the program remains viable in the future are the following: formally establish "tie-ins" as a replacement for troop information requirements, institutionalize the MCMAP as a formal part of the Marine Corps Physical Fitness Program, and initiate a comprehensive educational effort to better familiarize commanders about the MCMAP.

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PREFACE

Throughout my life I have always been involved in one way or another with martial arts, mostly Tae Kwon Do. After joining my first unit as a Second Lieutenant, I was made the "Unarmed Combat Instructor" for the company. Later, as a Captain, I attended the Linear Integrated Neural-Override Engagement or LINE Instructor Course shortly after its inception. As the Commanding Officer for Combat Instructor Company at The Basic School, I required all of my Marines to go through the fairly new Close Combat Instructor Course. It was during these training packages that I began to notice a significant and visible "change" in the Marines who participated and graduated from them. They began to act more mature, were more highly motivated, became more active in company events, and definitely wanted more training.

During this era General James L. Jones, our current Commandant, began an initiative to formally establish a Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). He envisioned a natural extension to our warrior ethos, a program that would continue in the tradition of "Every Marine a Rifleman." Continuing in a tradition of 226 years which saw the Corps become the finest fighting force the world has ever known, this was to be a program that would enhance each individual's

strengths in order to promote unit capabilities.

While serving at The Basic School, Marines under my command were in the right place at the right time to be called upon to receive the new MCMAP training and become some of the first Martial Arts Instructor Trainers (MAITs). In that capacity, I never heard them say that they had heard anyone, who was familiar with the program, think it was not an outstanding and worthwhile endeavor.

After reviewing the Commandant's intent, I became interested in the program's future possibilities. I also began to wonder if this would become just another requirement to an already full plate. The interesting twist to my investigation of this topic occurred while interviewing Lieutenant General George Christmas. He identified this new program as a possible means to sustain the transformation that affected each Marine and to maintain the warrior ethos developed during recruit training. It has been this ethos that ultimately sustains us in battle and has given rise to the noble reputation that Marines have enjoyed throughout the Corps' history.

My direction was now set on evaluating the historical development of Marine Corps training and how it related to creating and sustaining a warrior ethos. Also, given the changes in contemporary society, was a new program necessary to continue this process? The answer to this question is addressed in this paper.

The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice . . . the fast manner of living at the present day tends to undermine the nervous system, the fanaticism and religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age is lacking, and finally the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing . . . we should [therefore] send our soldiers into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.¹

¹ Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 519.

PROLOGUE

THE MARINE CORPS MARTIAL ARTS PROGRAM: SUSTAINING THE TRANSFORMATION

*People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence in the night on their behalf.*²

George Orwell

Part of the American military tradition is that during times of relative peace the nation, and likewise its military, tends to lose focus on warfighting and marginalizes or even decreases its military readiness. Although this trend in peace seems inevitable as policymakers balance "guns or butter," it is incumbent upon the military and its leadership to avoid this tendency and remain resolute in its dogged preparation for war in the unfortunate event of its occurrence in the unforeseen future.³ The potential danger lies in America's increasing sole reliance upon technology over basic combat-related skills as the primary means to win our nations battles. However, as Charles Ardant du Picq wrote in *Etudes sur le combat* published posthumously in 1903, "Battles [are] won not by weapons but by men, and nothing could be effectively planned in an army 'without exact knowledge of this primary instrument, man, and his moral condition at the vital moment of combat'."⁴ It seems therefore a critical requirement for the armed forces to not only enhance technology and

² George Orwell, n.d., URL:
<<http://www.gruntsmilitary.com/quote.htm>>, accessed 3 March 2002.

³ Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994). In their book, the authors describe and analyze the development of military policy, the characteristics and behavior of the armed forces in execution of that policy, and the impact of military policy on America's international relations and domestic development. It also describes in detail the role of social, economic, and political forces that shape military policy. For other discussions concerning the role of society upon the military see Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987).

⁴ Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 515.

improve its capability to fight, but also to develop the man and improve his ability and willingness to fight.

It was within this context that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, authorized the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program or MCMAP. His vision was to refine, or, if necessary, create a program that was more than just hand-to-hand combat. It was to become a weapons-based martial arts system that would also imbue a Marine with a proper understanding of the responsible use of force while further sustaining the warrior ethos developed during entry-level transformation.⁵ Given the two most recent attempts⁶ to incorporate a close combat system into the Corps, two questions arise, is this program really necessary? And, will it truly be different by succeeding in becoming a mechanism that actually ensures America's soldiers of the sea retain a combat focus and remain steadfast to its warrior ethos?

Through many competing interests and outside pressures like political restraints, budgetary limitations, parochial infighting, and societal concerns, the Marine Corps may find itself at times lacking in combat preparedness. Regardless of these circumstances there remains one aspect of preparation that the Corps must never forget or ignore: it must remain steadfast to its ethos and not allow its warrior spirit to ever wane or become irrelevant. This means it must hold on to that intangible combination of higher character, physical toughness, and mental discipline. These are the attributes that have allowed Marines to acquit themselves on the battlefield in such a manner as to become known for

⁵ Lieutenant Colonel George H. Bristol, *USMC PAO Guidance, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program Syllabus*, 28 September 2000. Cited hereafter as PAO Guidance.

⁶ See pages 26-34.

everything synonymous with the highest of military virtue, honor, and distinction.

The Corps' ethos must therefore remain unyielding and intact, for from it comes that wellspring of determination, self-discipline, self-confidence, and pride.⁷ It must be continuously developed, shaped, and honed in order to become immediately viable and applicable across the entire spectrum of violence. Every facet is essential. It is physical toughness that gives one the endurance to go beyond what he/she believes is possible. It is character imbued with honor, courage, and commitment that becomes the measure of a man and his ability to act honorably and make proper decisions despite opposition.⁸ Finally, it is the addition of mental discipline, in the form of a warrior mindset, that creates the final aspect of synergy that forges a man's martial spirit into a force that carries him above the horrors of war and allows him to carry the day when all the odds are stacked against him.

The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program tackles the challenge of integrating the separate disciplines of mental, physical, and character in such a manner so as to create a warrior being, one capable of effectively operating in the complex environment of the 21st century.⁹ The Corps has always enjoyed the reputation for innovative experimentation and successful implementation. Now, after several previous attempts at incorporating close combat into its training

⁷ Lieutenant General George Christmas, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, 6 December 2001.

⁸ As Theodore Roosevelt once said, "Character, in the long run, is the decisive factor in the life of an individual and of nations alike" *Resources-Quotes*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.josephsoninstitute.org/quotes/quotecharacter.htm>>, accessed 3 March 2003.

⁹ Sergeant Major Brian K. Pensak, USMC, *Structure and History of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program*, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

program, the Marine Corps' new martial arts program has a further distinctive approach. It finally generates significant value added by not only providing martial arts training, but also sustaining and maintaining that warrior transformation developed during initial training and, until now, had a tendency to subsequently disappear.¹⁰

History of Marine Corps Training

*The purpose of all Marine Corps training is the development of skilled forces-in-readiness prepared at all times to carry out any mission assigned.*¹¹

The Marine Corps began to critically review its training in the 1930's, but it wasn't until the 1970's, that training really received any methodical or scholarly attention.¹² While there is plenty of data cataloging recruit training, there remains no single, comprehensive document that tracks the evolution of all Marine Corps training programs from 1946-1978.¹³ That is not to say corporate learning and development had not occurred, as evidenced by the many training manuals and orders published separately during that period. However, even as of today, there still has not been an historical piece written that ties all the programs together.¹⁴

Syllabus, 11 October 2000. Hereafter cited as Pensak, Structure & History.

¹⁰ PAO Guidance.

¹¹ Major Paul Van Riper, USMC, Major Michael Wydo, USMC, and Major Donald Brown, USMC, *An Analysis of Marine Corps Training* (Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 1978), 10. (Quoted from the Marine Corps Manual, Washington D.C., 1961, para 1-27). Cited hereafter as Van Riper.

¹² Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by author, 13 January 2002.

¹³ Van Riper, xx.

¹⁴ The majority of references pertaining to the history of Marine Corps training are from Major Paul Van Riper's work, "An Analysis of Marine Corps Training," cited above, as there is little else currently published on that topic. In an e-mail from GM13 Danny J. Crawford, Head, Historical Reference Branch, History & Museums Division, Washington Navy Yard in response to an inquiry on this topic from Dr. Donald Bittner,

Historical Trend

Historically, combat preparedness and training have been directly related to the relative value placed upon the military itself. If citizens view themselves relatively secure, then the need for domestic programs rise and military force buildup diminishes. If the nation perceives itself threatened, then the focus shifts to military preparation. An example of this occurred after World War I when President Wilson made an appeal for a new international order, a world based on principle and law, rather than power and self-interest. With that in mind, he drew up his "Fourteen Points," making *general disarmament* one of those points. Also during that period, the U.S. was in a state of isolationism, tending to *focus priorities on its own internal domestic issues* because it felt unthreatened as an island nation and because it had firm European "allies."¹⁵ The underlying notion was, when times are good military priorities become subordinate to domestic ones.

Changes and Influence

Although most people understand the necessity for having the armed services, many disagree on what the standards for those who comprise them are or how robust and well equipped that force should be.¹⁶ Society itself changes over time and consequently so does its principles and moral values. These changes have a significant impact upon the

Professor of History, Marine Corps Command & Staff College, on 26 March 2002, Mr. Crawford writes, "I'm not aware of anything our Division has produced on the history of Marine Corps training."

¹⁵ Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1997), 3. The author cites several other historical examples of military priorities becoming subordinated to domestic ones during times of peace and elevated during times of trial.

¹⁶ Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Jr., USMC (Ret.), *Soldiers of the Sea* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1962), 603.

constituency of the force, as well as how the force views itself and how others view it.

An example would be society's view on aggression and violence. On the one hand, in the civilian world, domestic and "one-on-one" aggression is viewed as a bad thing since society perceives itself as more civilized and sensitive. Conversely, it also seems that people are becoming more desensitized to violence as the entertainment industry and news media influence continues to inundate the population with multiple images of carnage and disaster, where death and dying becomes more common—either in "make-believe" computer games, films, or in news reports.¹⁷ Ironically, the effect of this perspective has been the public's desire to minimize peacetime training, as it may affect their image or sanctuary, and in the case of war, the desire has been for it to become more technological, short, and with as few casualties as possible.¹⁸ The impact on training will be for the armed force to balance realistic and effective training with the need to avoid training injuries, especially deaths.

Another example is how morals and values have changed over time. There have been many debates as to what is acceptable and what is

¹⁷ *Violence in television*, 26 July 2001, URL: <<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/violence000726.html>>, accessed 2 April 2002. Senator Sam Brownback, R-Kan, stated at a summit on entertainment violence on 26 Jul 2001, "that four national health associations definitively linked violence in television, music, video games and movies to increased aggression in children. 'Its effects are measurable and long-lasting,' according to a joint statement by the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. 'Moreover, prolonged viewing of media violence can lead to emotional desensitization toward violence in real life.'"

¹⁸ *Quality and Quantity*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20001211.asp>>, accessed 2 April 2002.

not.¹⁹ What is not up for debate is the fact that the services still have to recruit personnel from whatever form or state of society that does exist. Regardless of the changes over decades, the Marine Corps has shown the ability to adapt its training to meet those conditions. As Colonel Robert Wagner noted, over time, "we [saw] a softer recruit show up for recruit training . . . we just had to work harder to get them up to the standards."²⁰ Thus, the pre-condition may change but the end result remains steadfast: producing a basically trained Marine.

It has become a truism that a certain minimum amount of realistic and effective training is absolutely essential in order to build and maintain individual and unit proficiency.²¹ As previously mentioned, there is a tendency to minimize the importance of military effectiveness during peacetime. There is also the possibility for external influences to affect the amount of support received by the military which directly impacts subsequent training effectiveness and warfighting development. An example might be U.S. foreign diplomacy resulting in the cancellation of a training exercise or use of a training area, or budgetary constraints resulting in the non-purchase of a "needed" capability.

These then are the conditions that set the tone for how the military will train and to what standards one will train. The military

¹⁹ J. Budziszewski, *Plunging into Ruin*, 1999, URL: <<http://www.family.org/cforum/teachersmag/features/a0007471.html>>, accessed 2 April 2002; Kenneth L. Conner, *Morality and the Rule of Law*, March 1999, URL: <<http://www.family.org/cforum/attorney/precedents/a0016020.html>>, accessed 2 April 2002. These two articles address the issue of morals & ethics from two different perspectives. The first discusses the nature of declining morals. The second discusses morality as it relates to the law.

²⁰ Colonel Robert P. Wagner, USMC, interview by the author, 4 January 2002.

²¹ Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1997), 60; Capt Ted McKeldin, USMCR, *From The Horse's Mouth* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1999), 20.

must and will remain subservient to its civilian leadership who represent their constituency, the American people.²² However, the armed services owe it to the public to constantly sustain its efforts to be the most effective and proficient force it can be. In order to balance these requirements, it becomes essential to clearly understand the requisite capabilities needed to meet the now and future threat, while also receiving the continued support of the public.

The Evolution of Recruit Training

*Training that provides improved individual and collective proficiency and prepares Marine Corps units to successfully execute their primary mission shall be assigned top priority.*²³

Although Marines trained in places like Parris Island prior to the U.S. involvement in World War I, it wasn't until 1939, that the Corps began to take on a systematic view of how it conducted training.²⁴ This more formal process focused mainly on recruit training, then only eight weeks in length.

He learned discipline, military courtesy, close order drill, and interior guard. He was given thorough physical conditioning to prepare him for the rigors of combat. He became intimately familiar with his rifle . . . And he received

²² An example of the military being subordinate to its political masters was demonstrated clearly when President Truman relieved "the distinguished, popular, and all powerful" General Douglas MacArthur with these few words, "I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States Military Forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General United States Army, Far East. You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway." *The Relief of MacArthur*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/pd-c-20.htm>>, accessed 26 March 2002.

²³ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 1553.3 Marine Corps Unit Training Management*, 11 June 1991, 2. Cited hereafter as MCO 1553.3.

²⁴ Van Riper, 246-247. Recruit training prior to 1939 will not be covered as there was no formalized, systematic approach to training during those early years and is therefore not pertinent to this topic.

elementary instruction in infantry combat subjects, including the digging of foxholes, bayonet, grenades, chemical warfare, map reading and basic squad combat principles.²⁵

Just prior to World War II, recruit training changed from eight weeks to four. Then it was reduced to three, and then finally back to four weeks.²⁶ These rapid changes reflected the close scrutiny of post-training proficiency (or lack thereof) coupled with the immediate implementation of "lessons learned." It also accounted for the need to ship out a larger number of personnel preparing to go to war.²⁷ The result of the shorter curriculum was a drastic decline in proficiency, especially marksmanship, which dropped as much as 25%.²⁸ Recognizing the need to improve the standards and maximize the number of hours that were actually applied to training, the schedule underwent several more revisions in order to optimize time and effectiveness.²⁹ During the course of the next few years, several significant changes occurred. Earlier training focused simply on Field Skills and Marksmanship, with field training generally increasing and becoming more specialized with each succeeding year. But as additional feedback was received from commanders in the operating forces, more classes, like range instruction and drill, were added to provide a better recruit upon graduation.³⁰

²⁵ Van Riper, 247.

²⁶ Van Riper, 248-252. The curriculum was shortened in order to "accommodate a large influx of personnel" that would fill combat units. "The reduction in training time resulted in a drastic decline in the quality of the graduating recruit." The curriculum was subsequently increased to four weeks as a compromise.

²⁷ Van Riper, 248, 281-282.

²⁸ Van Riper, 248.

²⁹ Van Riper, 252-254.

³⁰ Van Riper 248-252.

The value of physical training was first recognized during World War I, and later given more emphasis.

By May 1943 the physical training program at Parris Island included 30 minutes of accelerated calisthenics and body contact exercises and 30 minutes of massed barehanded boxing daily. In addition, there were 30 minute periods each week devoted to hand-to-hand fighting and unarmed combat, and daily half-hour periods of swimming instruction for recruits who could not meet the minimum qualification.³¹

In 1940, President Roosevelt stopped voluntary enlistment and began selective service resulting in a lowering of physical and mental standards.³² These "shortcomings" were partially offset by increasing the length of recruit training to 12 weeks in hopes of building up the recruit's strength. The course was later reduced to eight in order to meet the need for forces in the fleet. Then in 1944, the Drill Instructor School was created in order to improve the quality of instruction and training.³³ Shortly after the war a study of recruit training from 1939-1945 was made. It determined that eight weeks of training was the minimum necessary without sacrificing quality.³⁴ It also indicated a need to increase the emphasis on weapons instruction,

³¹ Van Riper, 252.

³² Gertrude G. Johnson, *Manpower Selection and the Preventative Medicine Program*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/booksdocs/PreventiveMedicine/Chap1.html>>, accessed 27 March 2002. "After the United States entered the war, the picture changed radically. A large Army was needed immediately. About 3,800,000 men entered the Army during 1942, through inductions and enlistments. Physical standards had to be lowered to get the number of men needed, and limited service personnel were accepted at a fixed percentage of the quota."

³³ *History of Drill Instructor School*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.mcrdsd.usmc.mil/Drill%20Instructors%20School/history.htm>>, accessed 27 March 2002.

³⁴ Van Riper, 253-254.

physical training, and other combat-related subjects.³⁵

Following the infamous 1956 incident where SSgt McKeon marched his recruits into Ribbon Creek resulting in six deaths, recruit training underwent many significant changes. One of those alterations was the formalization of physical training conducted by a certified instructor and the implementation of Pugil Stick fighting.³⁶ Additionally, after Recruit Training, all recruits would receive combat training at Infantry Training Regiments (ITR) in order, ". . . to ensure that all Marines possessed the individual combat skills necessary to survive on the battlefield."³⁷

During the 1960's and 70's, Recruit Training added not only garrison-type classes and swimming, but also grenade and booby-trap classes based upon the Vietnam experience.³⁸ In 1967, Marine Corps Order 1510.13, Male Recruit Training, was published. This formally standardized recruit training, and in 1973, recruit training and individual combat training were combined at the recruit depots.³⁹

The result of these changes was the creation of a training curriculum that recognized and retained all the lessons learned, such as the minimum time required to train proficiency in marksmanship, while still remaining within practical limits. This basic foundation for training included instruction in: discipline, military bearing, esprit de corps (warrior spirit), character development, individual general military subjects, individual combat basic tasks, marksmanship, and

³⁵ Van Riper, 254.

³⁶ Heinl, 593-594; Van Riper, 257-259.

³⁷ Van Riper, 283.

³⁸ Van Riper, 268-270, 285.

³⁹ Van Riper, 264.

physical fitness.⁴⁰ These lessons, which emphasized combat training and marksmanship, were crucial to the development of a warrior ethos and the making of a Marine.

As Figure 1 indicates, recruit training generally increased in length over time, as did *combat related training*.⁴¹ The curriculum also solidified the number of hours allocated to the foundational subjects mentioned above. While garrison-type training remained relatively the same, and administrative and commander's time was reduced, combat-related training increased 231%. Additionally, while physical conditioning, together with close combat remained about the same, the emphasis on close combat increased.⁴²

Throughout these transitions, the bottom line of recruit training had remained intact. To take civilians and transform them from individuals into team players who are disciplined, obedient, and basically trained Marines who can succeed on the battlefield, in garrison, and in society.⁴³

⁴⁰ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 1510.32C Recruit Training*, 5 October 1999, 1-2. Cited hereafter as MCO 1510.32C.

⁴¹ Van Riper, 254. "[A] study group investigating Marine Corps Ground Training in World War II made several conclusions about training . . . during the period 1939-1945: (1) Eight weeks proved to be the minimum length to which recruit training could be cut without sacrificing quality. (2) There was an ever increasing emphasis on training in weapons, physical conditioning, and other combat subjects and a corresponding decrease in training in close order drill, military courtesy, interior guard duty, parades and ceremonies, and similar garrison type subjects."

⁴² Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: ALMAR 042/01 Establishment of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)*, 200905Z SEP 01. It was during October 2000 that the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program was introduced, requiring 27 hours of training.

⁴³ MCO 1510.32C, 1-2.

Figure 1: RECRUIT TRAINING CURRICULUM 1939 - 2000⁴⁴
(Earlier samples, 1939-1965, do not account for all hours or total field training)

SUBJECT	1939	1940	1961	1965	1976	2000
(Number Training Wks)	4	7	12	8	11	12
Code of Conduct				2	2	2
Military Law			3	2	4	4
Leadership				5	2	3.5
Orientation			16	8	9.5	9.5
History & Customs	7	3	9	7	6.5	6.5
Mission & Org					1	1
Uniform & Equip			15	12	15	15
Interior Guard	6	11	5	4	8	8
Close Order Drill	31	44	72.5	53	45	54.5
Parades & Ceremonies			16	9	9	9
Total Garrison	44	58	136.5	102	102	113
Hygiene			4	4	3	?
Field Living			1	1	4	?
First Aid			3	3	4.5	?
Observe & Report					2	?
Ind. Movement, Day					3	?
Camouflage & Cover					1	?
Ind. Movement, Night					2	?
Helo Ops					1	?
Field Fortifications					1	?
NBC Defense					4	?
Offensive Combat					10	?
Defensive Combat					15	?
Grenades & Pyro					5	?
Mines & Booby traps					4	?
Field Training, Gen	34	72	?	?	-	?
Total Combat Trng	34	72	15?	7?	59.5	137.5
Rifle Mechanics		2	17	10	10	10
Rifle Marksmanship	70	70	124	89	89	89
Field Firing		8			7	7
Pistol Mech & Marksman			7	6	3	3
Swimming			10	8	16	16
Marches	16		4.5			13
Physical Conditioning	?	10.5	79	54	80	59
Bayonet	5	8		8		
Close Combat			14	8	9	27
Total Marksmanship/PT	91	98.5	255.5	183	214	224
Sub-Total Training	169	228.5	407	292	375.5	474.5
Admin Time	?	?	?	41	1175.5	988
Mess & Police	-	-	46.5	-	-	-
Commander's Time	?	?	18.5	93	255	55.5
Performance Evals	?	?	27	17	42	
Sub-Total "Admin Time"	?	?	92	151	1472.5	1043.5
GRAND TOTAL	169	228.5	499	443	1848	1518

⁴⁴ Van Riper, 249-277; *Recruit Training Schedule*, 1 October 2000, URL:<<http://www.parrisland.com/subjects.htm>>, accessed 28 December 2001.

Throughout the Corps' history, the importance of basic training became much more than teaching a raw recruit how to become a basically trained Marine.⁴⁵ It ultimately became a **transformation** process that indelibly imprinted a code of ethics, an ethos, upon his heart, forever.⁴⁶ That actual transformation remains above description, the product though does not--it's simply called, "United States MARINE."

The Warrior Ethos

*Big concepts are simple ideas understood by all, so the short answer to my definition of a warrior is--Marine.*⁴⁷

Colonel Michael O. Fallon

*Every generation of Marines boasts as being the best . . . as for 'warrior culture,' that is a phrase that post-dates me. Marines were Marines were Marines and they fought well whenever and wherever they were told. There was no need for rhetorical modifiers.*⁴⁸

It is important to recognize that individuals are all called "Marines" from the moment he or she graduates boot camp or Officer Candidate School. However, that name means many things to many people. It is often held synonymous with words like honor, courage, commitment, standards of excellence, professionalism, prestige, marksmanship, and valor, as well as nicknames such as "Devil Dog," "Leatherneck," and "Jarhead."⁴⁹ But one phrase remains singular among Marines regardless of occupation, and that is, "every Marine a rifleman."⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-11D, *Sustaining The Transformation* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 28 June 1999), 24. Cited hereafter as MCRP 6-11D.

⁴⁶ MCRP 6-11D, forward.

⁴⁷ Colonel Michael O. Fallon, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by author, 6 January 2002.

⁴⁸ Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by author, 7 January 2002.

⁴⁹ MCRP 6-11D, forward.

Since the 1980's, the term "warrior" seems to have come in vogue and is often misused in describing what Marines are.⁵¹ The term warrior is not a replacement name for Marine. To those who understand and truly appreciate the process involved in making Marines, the term simply means keeping the right focus as Marines.⁵² Marines come from diverse backgrounds and have different occupations, yet they all claim the same title. What that means is that they are all warfighters, first and foremost, not just employees doing their job. A Marine gets that ethos instilled in him or her during training at Boot Camp, or at Officer Candidate School (OCS) and The Basic School (TBS).⁵³ As Colonel Robert P. Wagner recently commented, "That is the common thread that runs through Marines, that's what makes Marines unique for one thing as that we're the only service that has those two sources as a common starting point, and it doesn't matter what your MOS is."⁵⁴ It is critically important that Marines do not use the term warrior as a qualifier as to who or who is not a Marine warfighter. Although Marines speak of developing or having a warrior mentality, that does not mean a Marine is not a warfighter . . . [a]ll Marines are warfighters by definition."⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: ALMAR 042/01 Establishment of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)*, 200905Z SEP 01. Cited hereafter as ALMAR 042/01.

⁵¹ Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC, "Every Marine a Warfighter," *Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 12 (December 2001): 48. Cited hereafter as Shelton.

⁵² Shelton, 48.

⁵³ MCRP 6-11D, forward.

⁵⁴ Colonel Robert P. Wagner, USMC, interview by the author, 4 January 2002.

⁵⁵ Shelton, 48.

Post Entry-Level Training

Once a Marine graduates from recruit training or Officer Candidate School, he/she must never consider his/her training complete. In reality it is only just beginning. In 1939, the Marine Corps published MCO 146, "Basic Training for Enlisted Men." It made commanders responsible for their Marine's proficiency as well as for their basic fitness.⁵⁶ This order was later superceded in 1947, by Letter of Instruction 1445, "Basic Training of Enlisted Men." It stated that,

the aim of all the required training was the establishment and maintenance of a high level of discipline, smartness, physical fitness, self-confidence, initiative, leadership, and pride in the Marine Corps . . . *that every Marine should be prepared for actual combat to the extent that none shall lack the knowledge of how to protect himself against hostile action and how to employ individual weapons effectively against the enemy.*⁵⁷

It was during this period that the Inspector General of the Marine Corps became concerned about the state of training.⁵⁸ It was identified that commanders were not making optimal use of their time because they had their Marines working on other projects, such as police details, cleaning individual gear, standing inspections, or playing organized sports instead of training.⁵⁹ Training cards were thus established in an attempt to track progress while commanders were expected to periodically extend regular working hours in order to bring their unit up to the standards outlined for their respective occupations in accordance with Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1445, and later LOI 1544.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Van Riper, 290, 293.

⁵⁷ Van Riper, 294. Italics are the author's emphasis.

⁵⁸ Van Riper, 295.

⁵⁹ Van Riper, 295.

⁶⁰ Van Riper, 293, 295-296.

Through the 1950's and 1960's, several more changes to LOI 1544 were promulgated based upon the premise that Marines should be doing more training.⁶¹ Although a Physical Readiness Test was added, it was determined that machineguns, mortars, and rockets were no longer required subjects for all Marines and that the language stipulating all Marines be qualified as infantrymen be removed.⁶² Additionally, a dilemma arose: there was also a concern that Marines were now being asked to do too much.⁶³ As stated by a Headquarters Marine Corps memorandum, "[t]he 59% failure rate suffered by major commands is a direct result of an imposition of too many training requirements."⁶⁴ It seemed the general subjects training program had over the years become an accumulation of tasks of which some had little to do with a particular Marine's occupation.⁶⁵ The Inspector General noted, "Commanders do not have the training time available to devote to improving individual proficiency in a large number of subjects for which there is no requirement in the unit's mission."⁶⁶

The end result of these findings became the MCO 1510.2X series (1956-1974), "Individual Training of Enlisted Marines" and the "Guidebook for Marines."⁶⁷ These listed the required essential subjects for all

⁶¹ Van Riper, 300.

⁶² Van Riper, 301.

⁶³ Van Riper, 304.

⁶⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, *Marine Corps Memorandum A03C20-awz: Individual Training of Enlisted Men*, (Washington, D.C.: 16 April 1970), 1.

⁶⁵ Van Riper, 304.

⁶⁶ Van Riper, 304.

⁶⁷ Van Riper, 297-298. General Order Number 10 of 1 February 1949, classified training subjects as "basic," "technical," and "tactical," and listed organizations by duty categories (i.e., Recruit Depots, Fleet

Marines, regardless of their billet description.⁶⁸ By 1991, MCO 1510.34A "Individual Training Standards (ITS) System," appeared which listed the common required essential subjects for Marines sharing common billet descriptions.⁶⁹ This also gave rise to the Mission Essential Task List (METL) concept that focused additional training requirements commensurate to the unit's mission.

What was argued about then is still relevant today. The Corps must take a very close look at what is truly important to its primary mission areas and continue to train to that standard. It must do this while also remaining true to its core ethos, "every Marine a rifleman," or risk losing its combat focus.⁷⁰ Marines cannot train for every possible mission profile or they will become the proverbial "jack of all trades and a master of none." However, the Corps must identify and focus on the most likely threats and ensure its capabilities are commensurate with meeting those threats. The bottom line is that commanders are mandated

Marine Forces, etc). The order also incorporated these "General Subjects" into the promotion process, making this new "Guidebook for Marines" an essential element for promotion preparation.

⁶⁸ U.S. Marine Corps, *Guidebook for Marines* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1978), iii; Van Riper, 39. The basic essential subjects were: Code of Conduct/Military Law, Physical Fitness, History & Traditions/Discipline & Courtesy, Interior Guard, Close Order Drill, Uniform Clothing & Equipment, Service Rifle & Marksmanship, Individual Tactical Measures, First Aid/Sanitation & Hygiene, and NBC Defense; later expanded to include: Insignia of Grade, General Administration, Leadership, Infantry Weapons, Pistol, M14 Rifle, M16 Rifle, M203 Grenade Launcher, Grenades & Accessories, M60 Machinegun, Infantry Battalion Weapons, Demolitions & Mines, Bayonet, Basic Communications, Land Navigation, Combat Formations & Signals, Protective Measures, Scouting & Patrolling, Squad Tactics, and Common Military Terms.

⁶⁹ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 1510.34A Individual Training Standards (ITS) System*, 10 June 1992. Cited hereafter as MCO 1510.34A.

⁷⁰ ALMAR 042/01.

to ensure their Marines are properly trained to the prescribed standard and always combat-ready.⁷¹ To do any less is simply negligence.

Training Philosophy and Methodology

*Marines are aggressive. If we ever lose that style of fighting, we won't be the Marine Corps.*⁷²

Colonel John Ripley

So today what are the standards and how do Marines ensure they remain in compliance? The objective of the Marine Corps training system is clear, "[t]he nation must have units that are ready for combat! Because the Marine Corps trains for war, not for peace, the intended battle determines training directions and goals."⁷³ As General Charles Krulak, the Marine Corps' 31st Commandant put it, ". . . we make Marines and win battles."⁷⁴ Training and education are separate but essential facets to achieving Marine Corps objectives. For this paper, the focus will remain on training while recognizing that education is complementary to and overlaps training, but yet is somewhat different.⁷⁵

Training is conducted at various times throughout a Marine's career: officer acquisition, recruit and officer basic training, skill

⁷¹ MCO 1553.3.

⁷² McKeldin, 6.

⁷³ Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-0A, *Unit Training Management Guide & How to Conduct Training* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1996), 1.

⁷⁴ General C.C. Krulak, *An Inside Look at the 1996 Almanac edition of Marines Magazine*, n.d., URL: <http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/marines.nsf/e7398bff9f70330b852562c9005ea98b/ffc68aalb00e2b09852562dd0072924d?OpenDocument>, accessed 3 March 2002.

⁷⁵ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 1553.1B Marine Corps Training and Education System*, 24 May 1991. Cited hereafter as MCO 1553.1B. Training is that which provides the individual or unit with knowledge, skills, and proficiency required for immediate application in the accomplishment of a specific task, whereas education provides the individual with the knowledge and the creative mind required to cope with tasks that may occur but are not yet specific or well defined.

qualifications, mission orientation, career level training, essential subjects maintenance, and other related training.⁷⁶ It is conducted through formal schools or designated command schools by means of Field Skills Training (FST), Managed-On-the-Job Training (MOJT), On-the-Job Training (OJT), or correspondence courses.⁷⁷ Approximately 30% of enlisted Marines received OJT in FY 1978, a percentage that has been dramatically reduced today by sending almost every Marine to a formal school. The result is a better and more uniformly trained Marine.⁷⁸

Training is conducted through a variety of venues. These include lecture/presentation, demonstration, imitation, practical application, guided discussion, seminar, case/battle studies, staff rides, etc. Training itself is assessed by evaluating the student, the instructor, and the course content through testing, and then either validated, adjusted, or processed through a review board. The purpose of this testing is to evaluate, graduate, or eliminate students from a program, as well as diagnose learning difficulties, maintain quality control, and measure the adequacy of the institutional system.⁷⁹ Thus it becomes critical to have validated systems that properly and effectively teach while accurately evaluating the measure of effectiveness.⁸⁰

Commanders need a mechanism to specify what type of training they want their subordinates to have. This must be based upon the capabilities that are required to engage their most likely threats. After much analysis, in 1991, the Marine Corps adopted a performance-

⁷⁶ Van Riper, 34.

⁷⁷ Van Riper, 37.

⁷⁸ Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by author, 13 January 2002.

⁷⁹ MCO 1553.1B; MCO 1553.3; Van Riper, 54.

based Training Management (TM) process whereby, ". . . all individual and collective training conducted by units within the operating forces and supporting establishment shall be prioritized by the commander relative to assigned missions."⁸¹ This process consists of five phases:

Analysis - determine mission requirements and training goals,

Design - select training tasks, identify units to be trained, schedule training,

Development - prepare and setup training events with associated support,

Implementation - conduct the training, and

Evaluation - evaluate effectiveness.⁸² The methodology created to actually implement this process, and one that is still in effect today, is the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), which is a:

Standards-based methodology for analyzing, developing, implementing, and evaluating the process of educating and instructing relative to specific objectives that supports task performance. Training standards serve as the basis for unit training management, requiring unit commanders to use training standards to identify collective or individual proficiencies and deficiencies, select tasks to be trained, determine training methods, and evaluate the final result.⁸³

There are two types of training standards within the SAT process, Mission Performance Standards (MPS) and Individual Training Standards (ITS).⁸⁴

The program is based upon wartime requirements and the, ". . . training standards derived from specific mission requirements of the Marine Corps

⁸⁰ MCO 1553.1B; MCO 1553.3; MCO 1510.34A; MCRP 3-0A; and MCRP 3-0B.

⁸¹ MCO 1553.3,1.

⁸² MCRP 3-0A, 3-1.

⁸³ MCO 1553.1B, 2-3; MCRP 3-0A, 1-3.

⁸⁴ MCO 1553.1B, 5.

and developed using current doctrine."⁸⁵ The status of a unit's capability or readiness is generally reported via "Marine Corps Ground Equipment Resource Reporting" (MCGERR) and the "Status of Resources and Training System" (SORTS).⁸⁶

Mission Performance Standards are the collective tasks for which units are responsible and are also the measure of a unit's proficiency to perform a particular mission requirement. They define what a unit's capabilities should be, and thus can be considered a "Mission Essential Task." MPS's are published as part of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES).⁸⁷

Individual Training Standards (ITS) are the individual tasks that support the collective MPS's. ITS's are developed and published to ensure that all Marines of a given rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) are trained to the same standard. Most ITS's are derived from the MCCRES and prescribe those individual tasks that a Marine must be able to perform in order for the unit to successfully execute the MPS.⁸⁸ The end result is a system where individual standards-based tasks support the collective mission performance tasks that provides a measure of effectiveness of a unit's capability to meet a stated mission requirement.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ MCO 1510.34A, 10 June 1992.

⁸⁶ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 3000.11C Marine Corps Ground Equipment Resource Reporting (MCGERR)*, 1 December 1997, 1.

⁸⁷ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 3501.1C Marine Corps Combat Readiness & Evaluation System (MCCRES)*, 30 March 1993. Cited hereafter as MCO 3501.1C.

⁸⁸ MCO 1553.3, 11 June 1991.

⁸⁹ MCO 3501.1C.

Throughout its history and through dramatic changes, the Marine Corps has remained circumspect enough to learn, adapt, and implement those changes necessary to improve not only training and education itself, but also the systems that govern its application. Although training and its implementing systems appear to have improved, that is not to say that the overall capability has become more enhanced. Marines may be trained well enough to fight, but do they possess the will to fight and the judgment to know when and where not to?

Development of Martial Arts in the Marine Corps

The first thing that should be noted is that the Marine Corps' current training system is the product of many decades of evolution. Marines learned there are often many competing interests and resources which cause their programs to become unintentionally other than that intended. However, there is one principle that must be adhered to in spite of all this: to train to a standard that allows the Corps to meet and defeat an enemy across the entire spectrum of conflict.⁹⁰ Simply stated by Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, ". . . War means fighting, and fighting means killing."⁹¹

Martial Philosophy

*[T]he Manchurian campaign [World War I] showed over and over again that the bayonet was in no sense an obsolete weapon and that fire alone could not always suffice to move from a position a determined and well-disciplined enemy.*⁹²

As French Colonel de Grandmaison wrote in
1911,

⁹⁰ Sergeant Major Brian K. Pensak, USMC, *Continuum of Force*, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program Syllabus, 30 November 2000.

⁹¹ Justin Brasher, *Gigantic Tennessean*, 1999, URL: <<http://members.aol.com/GnrlJSB/NBFprofile.html>>, accessed 3 March 2001.

⁹² Howard in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 518.

It is more important to develop a conquering state of mind than to cavil about tactics . . . In battle one must always be able to do things which would be quite impossible in cold blood . . . we have to train ourselves to do it and train others, cultivating with passion everything that bears the stamp of the offensive spirit. We must take it to excess: perhaps even that will not go far enough.⁹³

Following the experiences of the Manchurian Campaign during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and in preparation for war, the European armies began to indoctrinate their men with the idea that they were not only to sacrifice for their country, they were also to be prepared to die for it—the idea of supreme sacrifice.⁹⁴ Americans too were about to embrace this ideal during World War II. In December 1941, the bombing of Pearl Harbor taught the U.S. something relatively new as a nation, something that it was reluctant to face: the nation was surprised by an enemy who would not play by the then perceived acceptable rules and had attacked the U.S. on its own soil.⁹⁵ This attack on the Hawaiian Islands shattered the sense of fair play in the minds of most Americans, while also introducing a foe to them who was well trained for brutal, cold-hearted killing.⁹⁶ A new dawn began on December 7th, along with a total change in mindset and behavior as men now, “. . . had to be taught to

⁹³ Howard in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 520.

⁹⁴ Howard in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 522.

⁹⁵ Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-80, *Kill or Get Killed* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1991), introduction. Originally published in 1943. Cited hereafter as FMFRP 12-80. As stated in the introduction, LtCol Rex Applegate published, “Kill or Get Killed” in 1943 and “[it] became, and has remained, the basic classic text on close combat.” LtCol Applegate was taught the techniques of close combat by many of the world’s finest combat experts, including Capt W.E. Fairbane and Capt E.A. Sykes of the British 3 Commando, and Colonel Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, USMC.

⁹⁶ Donald F. Bittner, “Justice M. Chambers, An American Cincinnatus,” in *The Human Tradition In The World War II Era*, ed. Malcolm Muir Jr. (DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001), 241. Here the author discusses the Marine’s shock over the Japanese fanaticism upon their initial encounter on Guadalcanal.

become tougher, meaner, more efficient and merciless than the enemy if this country was to survive."⁹⁷ Men who used to ask "why kill?," were now being taught to either kill or get killed.⁹⁸ These types of human factors played heavily on the minds of those who would face the enemy, and they also influenced the manner in which Marines trained to engage him. There is no better way to describe how the Corps eventually embraced this philosophy of close combat than the following:

The American soldier who meets [a ruthless] enemy is forced to adapt himself to a pattern of behavior that is foreign to his education and his religious beliefs. If he would win the fight—indeed, if he himself would survive—he must know all the dirty tricks of close combat, even as the enemy knows them Further, he must be able to take the initiative and attack an enemy soldier as ruthlessly as he, in turn, would be attacked if he waited. It is split second business. There is no time for moral debate. In close combat it is now or never.⁹⁹

Evolution of Unarmed Combat

From its beginnings, Marines have engaged in close combat fighting. Along with its inception in 1775, came the boarding party requirement where Marines spearheaded the ship-to-ship cross decking armed mostly with sword and bayonet.¹⁰⁰ During World War I, servicemen were taught the necessary techniques for brutal and close quarters battle.¹⁰¹ After World War II, hand-to-hand combat continued to evolve while the, "mysterious arts of the orient" were just beginning to become un-shrouded, Jiu Jitsu

⁹⁷ FMFRP 12-80, vi.

⁹⁸ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), 304. Hereafter cited as Millett. See also FMFRP 12-80, vii-viii.

⁹⁹ FMFRP 12-80, vii-viii.

¹⁰⁰ Millett, 25.

¹⁰¹ Millett, 301-314. The battles of Belleau Wood and Mont Blanc were fought with incredible daring and courage, where fighting was often reduced to Marines using "rifles, bayonets, and grenades against [German] artillery and machineguns," 313.

and later Judo being the most prevalent.¹⁰² The Marine Corps also recognized a need for close combat training based upon its limited small-wars experience¹⁰³ and continued to develop along those lines, but it also added a mental or spiritual dimension to the training as well . . .

The principle weapon of the combat organization is the rifle. The man so armed must have complete confidence in his ability to hit battlefield targets and must be thoroughly imbued with the 'spirit of the bayonet'— the desire to close with the enemy in personal combat and destroy him . . . It is only through [hand-to-hand] training that each individual of the combat team is imbued with the 'will to win.'¹⁰⁴

By 1943, recruit training incorporated thirty minutes of bare-knuckle boxing per day into the syllabus. This was in addition to thirty minutes of hand-to-hand combat training per week.¹⁰⁵ Although bare-knuckle boxing was removed by the mid 1960s, close combat was later increased to sixteen hours during the eight-week course.¹⁰⁶

In the decades after World War II, two significant events changed the scope of close combat philosophy. First, hand-to-hand engagements in the Chosin Reservoir of Korea and Hue City of Vietnam demonstrated that bayonet fighting and close combat were still relevant in modern war. Thus, both must continue to be taught in order to give the troops a

¹⁰² FMFRP 12-80, 2-4; *History of American Martial Arts*, n.d., URL: <http://www.mawn.net/his_us.htm>, accessed 23 December 2001.

¹⁰³ Millett, 187. At 0730 on 17 Nov 1915, Maj Smedley Butler led a group of Marines and sailors in an attack on the last stronghold of the Cacos bandits in Haiti. During the attack, the Marines crawled through an access tunnel in order to penetrate the fortress. The close quarter entry resulted in bloody hand-to-hand fighting. Within 15 minutes, more than 50 Cacos were killed. For additional accounts see Lowell Thomas' discussion in "Old Gimlet Eye;" Heinl, 177-178 and, *Major General Smedley D. Butler*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.mclm.com/tohonor/sbutler.html>>, accessed 3 March 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Navy and Marine Corps (NAVMC) 2890, *Small Wars Manual* (Reprint of 1940 ed) (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1940), 4-3.

¹⁰⁵ Van Riper, 252.

¹⁰⁶ Van Riper, 263.

fighting chance against an enemy who was trained in martial arts and who emphasized guerrilla, mob, and fifth column tactics.¹⁰⁷ The aim of close combat training now became not only just the physical, but also the mental. Marines had to be taught the mindset of killing, to kill or be killed.¹⁰⁸ The second, and perhaps more important, event that changed close combat training was the rise of a different type of conflict, that of mob violence.¹⁰⁹ The 1960's witnessed a dramatic rise in civil unrest in America, specifically expressed by sit-ins, protests, and riots.¹¹⁰ This form of altercation ultimately gave rise to intense study and reflection regarding the use of non-lethal combat, a seemingly contradiction in terms.¹¹¹ Up until now, close combat instructors spent numerous hours trying to inculcate their charges with a heavy dose of interpersonal violence, but now they were being challenged with also teaching restraint.¹¹²

It was also during this period that the military began observing and learning mob control tactics from civilian law enforcement

¹⁰⁷ FMFRP 12-80, x.

¹⁰⁸ McKeldin, *From the Horses Mouth*, 4. Here, Colonel Ripley states, "The skill to kill is not all we need; we also need the will to kill . . . But it can never cross that thin line and become the thrill to kill; this difference is critical."

¹⁰⁹ FMFRP 12-80, x-xi, 371-373.

¹¹⁰ SNCC, 1960-1966, n.d., URL: <<http://www.ibiblio.org/sncc/>>, accessed 4 March 2002. The incident that primarily sparked the sudden rise in civil rights activism occurred on February 1, 1960 after a group of black students were denied service at a Greensboro, N.C. Woolworth lunch counter. The aftermath produced a wave of sit-ins across U.S. college campuses, not only for civil rights, but also for free speech issues, women's rights, and later, Vietnam. Eventually peaceful protests gave way to riots, revealing that if civil unrest is not effectively addressed it will often lead to civil disturbance, as evidenced by the subsequent 1965 Watt's riot and the 1967 Detroit riot.

¹¹¹ FMFRP 12-80, xi, 4, 363, 367-370.

¹¹² FMFRP 12-80, xi, 4, 363, 367-370.

agencies.¹¹³ Additionally, Asian martial arts became a huge phenomena within this country after servicemen stationed in Southeast Asia began to bring back the arts taught to them by the masters in Japan and Okinawa, or by Asian instructors who had immigrated to the U.S., mainly in Hawaii, San Diego and Seattle.¹¹⁴ An example of this influence is demonstrated by General Curtis E. Lemay's organizing his physical conditioning unit based primarily upon Judo while he was the Commander-in-Chief for Strategic Air Command¹¹⁵

Along with this Asian influx came "Bushido," or the Warrior's Code. This literally meant "military-knight-ways" which was a "philosophy" that began in feudal Japan and was eventually incorporated into modern-day martial arts.¹¹⁶ The philosophy embodied a code of chivalry or nobility and added the elements we would call character and mental discipline.¹¹⁷ In Japan it was a code that brought ethics to the bu-ki, or fighting knights who were the professional warrior class also known as samurai. In the U.S., Bushido was taught more as a form of discipline in application and aggression control; the student was expected to be in control of himself and his situation despite experiencing adversity. This idea of restraint became more prevalent after law enforcement and National Guard units gained experience with the use of force during riot

¹¹³ FMFRP 12-80, 4, 366-367, 369-370.

¹¹⁴ FMFRP 12-80, 1-3; *Martial Arts History*, n.d., URL: <http://www.mawn.net/his_us.htm>, accessed 23 December 2001. Hereafter cited as *Martial Arts History*.

¹¹⁵ *Martial Arts History*.

¹¹⁶ Inazo Nitobe, "Bushido, The Warrior's Code," in *Bushido, The Warrior's Code*, ed. Charles Lucas (Burbank: Ohara Publications Inc., 1979), 13. Hereafter cited as *Bushido*.

¹¹⁷ *Bushido*, 13-14.

control against U.S. private citizens.¹¹⁸ "The bushido code required knowledge to be a means to the attainment of wisdom 'To know and to act are one in the same.'"¹¹⁹

Although the bushido code would later take on a much more significant role, initially the philosophy was only partially embraced as it carried a religious connotation unfamiliar to westerners.¹²⁰ Incorporating the lessons of both the defense-oriented civil disturbance training and the offense-oriented martial arts, the Marine Corps made an attempt to teach a, "new form of unarmed combat." This philosophy taught the softer facets of unarmed restraint, in order to handle civil disturbance-type operations (where use of force is at the minimum level), while also continuing to teach the standard hard styles.¹²¹ What was actually occurring was that the former combat-oriented hand-to-hand techniques were now being transformed into a more sports-oriented, self-defense style, primarily Judo.¹²²

Subsequently, instruction during the 1970's basically resembled a game of pickup football: whoever was available with some form of boxing or hand-to-hand training was tasked to teach his unit whatever it was that he knew.¹²³ Needless to say, there was no across-the-board instructional quality control or uniformity. Not until the 1980's, was a

¹¹⁸ FMFRP 12-80, 370.

¹¹⁹ Bushido, 18.

¹²⁰ Bushido, 15.

¹²¹ Pensak, Structure & History.

¹²² *Martial Arts History*, n.d., URL: <http://www.mawn.net/his_us.htm>, accessed 23 December 2001.

¹²³ Major Ken Wolf, USMC, interview by the author, 16 March 2002. Major Wolf was a prior enlisted Marine who participated in hand-to-hand training during the 1970s.

more formal system evolved and taught to Marines.¹²⁴ Marine GySgt Ron Donvito introduced the Linear Infighting Neural-Override Engagement, or LINE, system in order to provide a more standardized program of instruction.¹²⁵ It was designed to be a combat system that could be easily learned and retained, while also capable of being conducted while fatigued, wearing full gear, and during times of limited visibility.¹²⁶ Initially introduced on the East Coast and later taught to all Marines, the unfortunate result was that the program fell by the wayside because,

the Corps as a whole [was never able] to integrate the close-range combat piece to other aspects of training. It has always remained just outside the mainstream, practiced with zeal in entry-level training and later by a few stalwarts, but ignored by the Corps as a whole.¹²⁷

In 1996, under the auspices of MGySgt Cardo Urso, a review of the LINE system was conducted in order to develop a more comprehensive Marine Corps Close Combat System by combining all training associated with close combat into one program.¹²⁸ The review, ordered by then Commandant, General C.C. Krulak, considered all current programs in addition to receiving input from approximately ten other subject matter experts from various martial art disciplines such as karate, judo, jujitsu, and

¹²⁴ Pensak, *Structure & History*.

¹²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel George H. Bristol, "Integrated Fighting System—The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program," *Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 7 (July 2001): 38. Cited hereafter as Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*.

¹²⁶ FMFM 0-7, updated and redesignated as Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02B, *Close Combat* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2000).

¹²⁷ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 38.

¹²⁸ Lieutenant Colonel George H. Bristol, *The Sword and the Spirit*, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program Syllabus, 16 November 2000. Cited hereafter as Bristol, *The Sword and the Spirit*.

aikido.¹²⁹ The strengths and weaknesses of each were evaluated, and the positives eventually combined to form one system, the Marine Corps Close Combat Program.¹³⁰ However, the problem of institutional "buy in" again occurred.

In each and every attempt to develop a system, the fighting techniques contained a high degree of effectiveness if practiced and maintained . . . [h]owever, because these skills and techniques were never truly insinuated into the training of our operational forces, these programs were relegated to separate status. Close combat training became additive to and not complementary with basic combat training; and [herein] was the failure.¹³¹

Another shortcoming of the program was its failure to integrate weapons into the system.¹³² Bayonet fighting had previously been the predominate form of close combat training taught from World War I through the early 1970s, but it was now "missing in action."¹³³ The Director of the current Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, LtCol George Bristol,

¹²⁹ Andrea Stone, "Martial Arts to Create New Breed of Marines," *USA Today*, 8 March 2001; Pensak, *Structure & History; A Brief History*, n.d., URL: <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/TbsNew/Pages/Martial_Arts/Program_Philosophy/History/history.htm>, accessed 1 April 2002.

¹³⁰ Pensak, *Structure & History*. Additionally, as stated in the MCMAP PAO Guidance, MCMAP was built upon the success and evolution of the LINE and Close Combat programs, yet is unique in its integration of the mental, physical, and character disciplines.

¹³¹ Bristol, *The Sword and the Spirit*.

¹³² Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 38.

¹³³ Van Riper, 277; Captain Michael O. O'Leary, Royal Canadian Regiment, "A la Bayonet, or, 'hot blood and cold steel'," *Canadian Infantry Journal*, no. 34 (Spring 2000): 5-6, 24. Bayonet training received less attention from around 1976 to the mid-1980s, due in part to the "belief" that bayonet fighting was becoming more unlikely in modern warfare (several historical battle studies, from the French Revolution to the American Civil War, concluded that only 2.4% of casualties were inflicted by bayonet, and that the trend would likely continue). Also, that bayonet training was difficult to conduct, time-consuming, and provided little practical utility. See also Tom Rick's, *Making the Corps*, 146.

addressed this dilemma when he said, "We are a weapons-based organization, and we normally won't go into a fight empty handed."¹³⁴

With only four years in existence, the infant close combat program was on the verge of becoming "irrelevant" when the new Commandant, General James L. Jones, revealed his vision for a "different" kind of Martial Arts Program. He wanted something new, lasting, and, more importantly, viable and effective. He directed that a study be conducted in May 2000, at Camp Pendleton, to test, evaluate, and develop a fighting system that would meet the following goals: (1) keep the Corps as an elite fighting force, (2) be applicable across the spectrum of violence, (3) strengthen our ethos and morale, and (4) enhance recruiting and retention.¹³⁵

Once again, the Marine Corps underwent a round of testing, reviewing, and comparing a variety of programs; however, this time things were different, the Corps now had support from the highest level--the Commandant wanted this program and he wanted it to be institutionalized.¹³⁶ During the course of the next few weeks, two separate programs were tested. The first was an improved version of the former Close Combat Program focusing on the integration of the physical art with the Marine Corps' core values program.¹³⁷ A company called "SportsMind," which specializes in, "improving productivity and competitive advantage by helping clients develop teams that produce

¹³⁴ Lieutenant Colonel George Bristol, USMC, "Martial Arts Instructor Trainer Course," an introduction to the course given at The Basic School, Quantico, VA, 8 January 2001.

¹³⁵ ALMAR 042/01; Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 38.

¹³⁶ ALMAR 042/01.

¹³⁷ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MARADMIN 537/01 Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)*, 260900Z OCT 01. Cited hereafter as MARADMIN 537/01.

powerful results,"¹³⁸ designed the second program, called "Marine Warrior." It used "mind-body-team techniques to create a new, more comprehensive form of human performance technology."¹³⁹ The final result was a system that incorporated facets of both test programs, in addition to adding elements from other styles like jujitsu.¹⁴⁰ On 1 October 2000, the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program was officially adopted, requiring all Marines to participate in the training.¹⁴¹ Although there are several differences that make this system unique from its predecessors, one important facet of this program is that it now integrates the previously overlooked mental and character disciplines into the physical.¹⁴²

Current Program

The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is a unique blend of combat-tested martial art techniques that compliments the Marine Corps Values Program.¹⁴³ It is a weapons-based system that teaches the elements of close combat, ranging from assault fire to bayonet fighting, to edged weapons or weapons of opportunity employment, and then the more perilous unarmed combat techniques.¹⁴⁴ Unlike civilian martial arts that focus

¹³⁸ *Sportsmind*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.sportsmind.com/Fundem.html>>, accessed 7 March 2002.

¹³⁹ PAO Guidance.

¹⁴⁰ Andrea Stone, "Martial Arts to Create New Breed of Marines," *USA Today*, 8 March 2001.

¹⁴¹ ALMAR 042/01; MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁴² PAO Guidance.

¹⁴³ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO 1500.56 Marine Corps Values Program*, 16 December 1996. A program whose goal is to instill the meaning of the words honor, courage, and commitment into every Marine. It is designed "to produce Marines who are exemplary citizens and who will act honorably and intelligently, whatever their situation or level of responsibilities."

¹⁴⁴ Pensak, *Structure & History*.

more on self-defense or sports competition, the MCMAP is truly a combat-oriented art that covers the entire spectrum of violence from verbal commands to deadly force.¹⁴⁵ By definition, "martial" means war or military, and as such this program aims to focus within that arena. This means simply that it uses and trains with weapons.¹⁴⁶ However, in the course of his duties, a Marine definitely needs to know when it is right to pull the trigger and when it is not. He needs to understand the responsible use of force and that,

it is not enough for the martial man to function merely civilly; he is required to function admirably. His dual nature is to be more combatively capable than his civilian counterpart and possess the self-control to function with his fellow citizens . . . he must be fully trained in both the capability to kill and the compassion of knowing when not to.¹⁴⁷

It is this last element that becomes vitally important as Marines begin operating in unknown future environments where the potential to respond with various levels of violence, all within the space of a few blocks, remains prevalent. This is a condition General C.C. Krulak termed, "the three block war."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 38.

¹⁴⁶ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 38.

¹⁴⁷ Bristol, *The Sword and the Spirit*.

¹⁴⁸ *The Urban Operations Journal*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.urbanoperations.com/>>, accessed 1 April 2002. "In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war." General Charles C. Krulak, USMC.

Structure

*This program strives to develop the successful and ethical Marine warrior in a team framework. It will incorporate much of today's current leadership, core value and ethics training with very lethal physical techniques to develop Marines who are able to meet the challenges of the entire spectrum of conflict.*¹⁴⁹

The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program integrates three basic disciplines, mental, character, and physical, and then forges them into one. This creates a Marine who is holistically developed in mind, body, and spirit. It is designed to produce an effective combat-oriented fighter as efficiently and quickly as possible.¹⁵⁰ The program actually begins at the entry-level schools with the issue of a Marine's basic weapon, the M16A2 rifle. It then is subsequently developed and sustained by the basic marksmanship and enhanced shooting skills instruction he/she receives throughout his/her career. It is only after the magazine goes empty, the weapon jams, or the Marine finds himself/herself without a weapon that the true use of the Martial Arts Program begins.¹⁵¹

Military studies have shown that it is far easier to teach Americans to kill using firearms than it is to teach them to kill using their bare hands or knives. No matter how bad the boys from the 'hood say they are, hardly anyone likes feeling and smelling and hearing a living creature die in his hands. Even butchers may require or follow special cleansing rituals.¹⁵²

Herein lies the challenge and the reason why the mental and character discipline training is so important. It is critical for the Marine to

¹⁴⁹ Sergeant Trent Kinsey, USMC, *Division Learns New Way to Fight*, n.d., URL: <http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/PAO/MFRNews/01storiesforMFRNews/SpringSummer/DivMartialArts.htm>, accessed 23 December 01.

¹⁵⁰ ALMAR 042/01; PAO Guidance, paragraph 2.

¹⁵¹ Bristol, *The Sword and the Spirit*.

¹⁵² Joseph R. Svinth, *On Killing*, November 1999, URL: http://ejmas.com/jcs/jcsart_svinth5_1199.htm, accessed 23 December 2001.

not only know how to kill and when to kill, but also how to cope with it after the fact.¹⁵³ The martial art syllabus, through classes, "tie-ins" (classes taught immediately following a martial art event), case studies, and warrior culture studies, provides that education.¹⁵⁴

Each of the three disciplines is divided into blocks of instruction and presented systematically within each of ten separate belt levels representing greater levels of mastery and proficiency. In ascending order the belts are: tan, gray, green, brown, and six levels of black. The blocks of instruction are cumulative in effect and build upon one another by adding new techniques with each successive belt, each level building upon the foundation from the previous one.¹⁵⁵

The first of the three components is mental discipline, which begins with a study of the art of war and encompasses the various aspects of professional military education.¹⁵⁶ This sets the foundation from which Marines learn the profession of arms and its application across the entire spectrum of violence and under a variety of circumstances.¹⁵⁷ It is also that which gives one, "the ability to keep going when things get tough, really tough."¹⁵⁸ This is where the Marine develops the mindset, or the resolve, to cast off his fears and engage the enemy or overcome

¹⁵³ Andrea Stone, "Martial Arts to Create New Breed of Marines"; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, USA (Ret.), *On Killing* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1995).

¹⁵⁴ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁵⁵ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁵⁶ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁵⁷ Pensak, Structure & History.

¹⁵⁸ Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), e-mail interview by author, 13 January 2002.

extreme hardships.¹⁵⁹ It differs from character in that a man may have good morals and impeccable integrity, yet may not have the determination to close with and destroy the enemy or continue the attack when completely fatigued. However, he must still possess all three disciplines, and they all must remain in balance in order to be effective, resolute, and just—the ability to kill, the will to kill, and the judgment to know when and when not to.¹⁶⁰

Character discipline is really the synthesis of Marine Corps Core Values coupled with high standards of morals and integrity.¹⁶¹ This is the aspect that provides a Marine with the common sense and proper attitude to do the right thing at the right time, even when no one is looking. The "MCMAP brings the character piece into sharper detail with a physical manifestation."¹⁶² It imbues the Marine with a sense of becoming a responsible warrior.

Finally there is the physical dimension, which is divided into three separate but interlocking pieces.¹⁶³ The first is purely the martial art techniques themselves. This begins by "seeking out, closing with, and destroying the enemy by fire and movement" but can evolve into "repelling his assault by fire and close combat."¹⁶⁴ This is where the Marine is taught various weapons and unarmed combat techniques commensurate with the belt level in which he is training. It is based

¹⁵⁹ Colonel Roderic S. Navarre, USMC, e-mail interview by author, 29 January 2002.

¹⁶⁰ McKeldin, 4.

¹⁶¹ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁶² Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁶³ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁶⁴ Pensak, *Structure & History*.

upon a building block approach giving the Marine ample opportunity to not only become proficient in his newly taught techniques, but also to sustain them through repetitive practice and weekly physical training.¹⁶⁵

The second part of physical discipline relates to combat conditioning, but with a martial focus. Again, the true essence of the term martial pertains to fighting and training as one would in combat. This means training while wearing regular combat gear and while undergoing simulated stresses that are as close to combat as can be duplicated.¹⁶⁶ Various drills are performed with the intent of creating fatigue and then having the Marines fight, perform proper techniques, or conduct exercises while experiencing a weakened condition. Combat conditioning usually includes Boots & Utes runs, combat swimming, grass drills, multiple runnings of the obstacle course, and running confidence course or endurance type courses.¹⁶⁷ Martial Art Drills usually incorporate the above along with several technique-oriented close combat exercises.¹⁶⁸

The final aspect of the physical discipline is the yet to be developed and integrated combat sports. Although many Marines have participated in boxing, wrestling, combat soccer, and field meets, this aspect really pertains to events like combat grappling and fighting that

¹⁶⁵ Major Christian L. Nicewarner, USMC, "The Martial Arts Program and the Training of One Rifle Company," *Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no. 12 (December): 15. Cited hereafter as Nicewarner.

¹⁶⁶ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁶⁷ Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02A (FMFRP 0-1B), *Marine Physical Readiness Training for Combat* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1988), Chapter III.

¹⁶⁸ MARADMIN 537/01.

also incorporates the use of weapons.¹⁶⁹ The idea is to further develop a Marine's martial abilities.

Each level incorporates instruction in four major areas: rifle & bayonet, bladed weapons, weapons of opportunity, and unarmed techniques.¹⁷⁰ The program also adds instruction on anatomy & physiology, human factors, combat behavior, and operational risk management.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, it integrates a detailed safety lecture within every period of instruction.¹⁷² Finally, the MCMAP conducts,

a series of presentations covering warriorship and martial culture . . . warrior case studies—accounts of individual Marines from the Corps' history—are given at the end of each MCMAP training session. Martial culture studies—cultures whose prime function is the breeding, training, and sustaining of warriors—are presented as guided discussions to give a Marine a perspective of his place in combative culture . . . rather than a history lesson, the Marine can compare and contrast his present environment with the past.¹⁷³

At the conclusion of training, belts are awarded based upon: proficiency in the physical techniques, participation in the character and mental "tie-ins," and upon receiving a recommendation from the reporting senior.¹⁷⁴ This last requirement ensures that a Marine has the requisite maturity, judgment, and moral character commensurate with the level of responsibility associated with each belt level.¹⁷⁵ Once the Marine has tested for and been awarded his/her belt, he/she is authorized to wear

¹⁶⁹ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁷⁰ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁷¹ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁷² MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷³ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39; MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷⁴ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷⁵ PAO Guidance.

that color belt, in lieu of his/her web belt with his/her camouflaged utilities, attesting to the level of proficiency he/she achieved.¹⁷⁶

No program could exist without having a well-trained and competent cadre of instructors. The MCMAP has two levels of instructors. The first is the Green Belt Martial Arts Instructor (MAI)(MOS 8551). The Marine must be a corporal or above and attend a three-week intensive program learning not only the martial arts techniques themselves, but also how to teach them.¹⁷⁷ The second is the Black Belt Martial Arts Instructor Trainer (MAIT) (MOS 8552). The Marine must be a sergeant or above and attend the six-week MAIT Course conducted at the Martial Arts Center of Excellence, The Basic School, Quantico, VA.¹⁷⁸ Instructors are authorized to train and promote Marines up to one level below the belt level they hold.¹⁷⁹

What Every Marine Expects and Our Country Requires

*When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen.*¹⁸⁰

When individuals join the Corps, they expect to become a part of the finest fighting force the world has ever known--second to none. They complete boot camp or Officer Candidate School (OCS) full of fire in their gut and with a feeling like they can conquer the world.¹⁸¹ The MCMAP is a natural extension of the pride and motivation developed during boot camp or OCS. It continues to build upon those values instilled in

¹⁷⁶ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷⁷ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷⁸ MARADMIN 537/01.

¹⁷⁹ Bristol, *Integrated Fighting System*, 39.

¹⁸⁰ *George Washington Quotations*, n.d., URL: <<http://www.memorablequotations.com/washington.htm>>, accessed 8 March 2002. George Washington (1732-99), U.S. General, President. Address, 26 June 1775, to the New York legislature.

¹⁸¹ MCRP 6-11D, forward.

the Marines throughout their training. In effect, it sustains the transformation that began on those yellow footprints and that is later culminated upon their receiving the eagle, globe, and anchor during "the crucible."¹⁸² This program aids in maintaining that ethos, shaped through trial and adversity, by continuing to challenge individuals through tough and physically demanding exercises. It is designed to enhance unit cohesion through team-oriented exercises whereby one man's fate is determined by another man's ability and resolve. It cultivates the Marine's character and mental strength through repeated lessons in ethics and values instruction during physical training, "tie-ins," and warrior case studies, thus producing a more ethical and selfless warrior who becomes more concerned about others rather than himself. It keeps Marines motivated simply because the program itself is motivating. The MCMAP delivers on a promise: it is both demanding and challenging.¹⁸³ Many Marines joined the Corps to be one of the best and to be challenged, and the martial arts program continues to do that.

What the Marine Corps receives through this process is a more motivated and capable Marine, one who is both better prepared to handle the uncertainties that exist on today's battlefield and total environment, and an individual who is more temperate within society.¹⁸⁴ As MGySgt Cardo Urso once stated, "[w]e want ethical warriors. The way a Marine should feel is, when you walk into a room, everybody in the room should feel safer because you're there. [And] when we turn him or her

¹⁸² MCO 1510.32C describes "the crucible" as, a rigorous, multi-faceted 54-hour field training event that culminates entry-level instruction at both recruit training and Officer Candidate School.

¹⁸³ Nicewarner, 16-17.

¹⁸⁴ PAO Guidance.

back to society after, say, four years, society's getting a better citizen."¹⁸⁵

The Future Program

The future looks bright for this new program. It gives the Marines something they were seeking when they first signed up. The program enhances the mental, physical, and character development of Marines. It gives them greater confidence in themselves, thus providing them the self-assurance that keeps them from having to prove it in a bar fight. It gives them the "when" and "why" for the proper use of force, not just the "how;" and, it builds unit cohesion.¹⁸⁶ But is this program going to end up the same way as those that had gone before it, i.e., disappear, or become just one more additional requirement on an already full plate?

Although the MCMAP requires an initial manpower investment, i.e., letting selected Marines attend a three to six week instructor course at either a Division School or Quantico, the investment is well worth it. The Martial Arts Instructors (MAIs) have literally seen hundreds of Marines go through all phases of the program and have never met anyone who has not been motivated and "changed" by his experience.¹⁸⁷

Aside from losing a couple of Marines for a few weeks, how do units incorporate and sustain this program in a high optempo and dynamic operational environment? The first thing that must change in order for the program to be successful is the mindset. Commanders cannot look at this as "just another requirement," for in fact it is not. Although the Commandant has made the program mandatory, it can be simply incorporated

¹⁸⁵ Stuart Taylor Jr., "Making the Tough Tougher," *National Journal*, 5 January 2002.

¹⁸⁶ Nicewarner, 16-17.

¹⁸⁷ Major John Bourgault, USMC, Deputy Director, Marine Corps

into the unit's pre-existing physical training plan. Although there is no current study that quantitatively proves this, it is postulated that Marines believe they retain troop information given to them during "tie-ins" better than if they received it in standard lecture format. This may give rise to the possibility of incorporating other required instruction, such as equal opportunity, sexual harassment, fraternization, suicide prevention, and substance abuse under the MCMAP in the form of "tie-ins," which already teach the same subjects, albeit in a less formal manner following a martial arts session. By incorporating several disparate requirements under one program, time management will become more proficient and more productive. Additionally, the MCMAP, and potentially the ties-ins, will be offered in an after-hours forum through the Semper Fit program.¹⁸⁸ The important thing initially will be to educate senior Marines in order for them to become aware of the depth of this program.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the Marine Corps has done a remarkable job in remaining critical of itself in recognizing its shortfalls, and then actively producing effective solutions to the problems.¹⁸⁹ A critical aspect to this was recognized through the history of training and experience where the Corps developed and maintained a common sense of

Martial Arts Center of Excellence, interview by the author, 4 January 2002; Nicewarner, 16-17.

¹⁸⁸ Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Subject: MCO P1700.29 Marine Corps Semper Fit Program Manual*, 8 November 1999. "Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) Semper Fit Programs are designed to assist our leadership in sustaining the transformation [P]rograms are directly related to combat readiness The primary focus of the Semper Fit Program will be to provide healthy lifestyle activities and education that assist the "Commander" in preventing situations before they develop into serious problems which negatively impact on mission readiness of our Marines, our commands, and the readiness of our families to succeed as partners in this challenging way of life."

¹⁸⁹ Millett, 607, 614-617.

being and shared purpose encapsulated within a martial spirit—the Marine Corps ethos.¹⁹⁰ Though social norming and political policies continue to shape our future youth, the Marine Corps has maintained its standards while adapting to this new environment, creating innovative approaches that still allow for the fashioning of a common citizen into a basic Marine.¹⁹¹ That Marine being an ordinary person imbued with an ethos that allows him/her to accomplish extraordinary things under incredible circumstances.

It is in the cradle of Recruit Training and Officer Candidate School/The Basic School where our ethos is instilled and nurtured, and the transformation born.¹⁹² It remains crucial then that we hold these institutions sacrosanct and their training protected in order to keep it relevant, effective, and tough. For the cost of lessening our standards and its effectiveness may well be weighted in lives. But herein lies the challenge: how to sustain that transformation and keep the fire going?

There have been a few programs created that try and “teach this transformation process,” but the reality is, “ya gotta live it.” The Marine Corps Martial Arts Program is a vehicle that ties it all together, the mind, body, and soul. The general consensus among instructors and commanders thus far has been that Marines who have participated in the program love it. They are noticeably different, noticeably motivated, and definitely more confident.¹⁹³ As General Christmas said, “three things a Marine needs today to be successful: self confidence, self

¹⁹⁰ Millett, 624-626.

¹⁹¹ Tom Ricks, *Making the Corps* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 50.

¹⁹² Colonel John R. Allen, USMC, telephone interview by the author, 30 January 2002.

¹⁹³ Bourgault.

discipline, and pride."¹⁹⁴ The MCMAP further develops each and every one of those tenants.

The real challenge yet remains: getting Marines to understand and participate in the entire program, not just the physical. Only then will this program bear out all of that for which it was intended. But how does the commander accomplish this within his unit?

Recommendations

In order to answer that question, the following are recommendations to an already well-structured program:

1) That the Commandant formally establish within the MCMAP a requirement for participating in the "troop information" type subjects through "tie-ins" such as suicide prevention, sexual harassment, equal opportunity, etc. This would be in lieu of the annual training requirements, and alleviate duplicated efforts. This will also save time in training schedules, and be more effective in learning. It would also become a necessary and integral part of a physical training regimen. A side benefit would be that commanders would view the program as not adding one more additional requirement to an already full plate, but a program that lessens the burden. These tie-ins would be taught by the command's senior leadership and by the MAITs. This of course would require that MAIT's become more knowledgeable and proficient in instructing outside their current areas of expertise. Instructors could be "murder-boarded" by the chain of command to ensure that learning objectives for which the instruction was intended is met.

2) Institutionalize the MCMAP as a formal part of the Corps' Physical Fitness Program and incorporate the Combat Conditioning piece.

¹⁹⁴ Lieutenant General George Christmas, USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, 6 December 2001.

The physical training aspect of this program not only meets, but also exceeds, the standards of combat fitness training desired for our Marines and does so in a motivating and team-building manner.

3) Put forth the effort to educate commanders about all aspects of the program as well as the specifics intended in a manner similar to how the "Commandant's Planning Guidance" was promulgated. In this fashion there will be less to question and more definitive action taken.

The Commandant, General James L. Jones, took the right approach in formalizing a program like the MCMAP in order to maintain a warrior focus in all training, not just tactical and physical. This program promotes a martial mindset that is important to all Marines. The Marine Corps needs to embrace this program by instituting and supporting it as well as participating. Through application of it the Corps is more likely to sustain the transformation all Marines have undergone through their initial training. Individuals entered the Corps seeking a challenge: they wanted to be Marines. And so while they still yet believe, so they are . . . the finest fighting force the world has ever known.

"Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray twilight that knows not victory or defeat." As long as the United States maintains any martial tradition or tests its power on the field of battle, the Marine Corps will more than bear its share of the burden. Marines face the future unafraid. Semper fidelis.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Millett, 626. Quote by President Theodore Roosevelt.

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The interviews of combat veterans were instrumental in providing valuable insight as to the nature of combat and the training needed in order to prepare for it. The interviewees also provided what they believed to be the essence of what makes Marines unique and combat proficient. This was essential in developing the premise that the Marine Corps ethos, formed during entry-level training, is critical to a Marine's warrior mindset and must be sustained. These veterans and subject matter experts also validated success or failure of various training programs and initiatives.

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